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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the dilemma NATO has faced since February 2014 
in its defence policy regarding the Baltic States. If NATO pursues a policy of deterrence, 
it might trigger war because Russia, the would-be deteree, may perceive actions taken by 
NATO as not intended to strengthen deterrence but rather to intimidate or coerce it. If it 
pursues an alternate policy of leaving the Baltic States visibly undefended, it might trigger 
war because Russia may see this as a sign of weakness and a gap to be exploited. This article 
investigates the logic of the dilemma, before considering whether NATO’s choice, made at 
the Warsaw Summit of July 2016, is working as intended. Ultimately, we cannot predict the 
answer and, therefore, we should consider all possible outcomes, including those which lead 
to a defensive war in the Baltic States.
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Introduction
Since its February 2014 aggression in Crimea and later in the Donbas, Russia, in one 
fell swoop, suddenly became the primary potential danger to NATO, particularly 
to the Baltic States, NATO’s easternmost and most vulnerable constituents. 
NATO’s response to the new security environment began as offering reassurance 
to eastern Europe before finally transitioning to deterrence for the purposes of 
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precluding war. Since Crimea, NATO has moved from a policy of reassurance 
to one of deterrence. It has been evident that throughout these important policy 
debates and changes, NATO has been suffering from a dilemma concerning Baltic 
defence which is unlikely to be resolved in any immediately obvious way.
This article analyses the unenviable defence dilemma which NATO faces – that 
NATO is unlikely to influence the Kremlin in the exact direction it desires. Any 
defence policy decision which NATO may make-and that policy’s subsequent 
implementation-may spark war as easily as it might prevent it. This is true of 
the deterrent policies which NATO has now chosen to pursue. It is also true 
of the policy option of leaving the Baltic States militarily undefended, which 
has had some support throughout the whole debate. Whether it consciously 
recognised this dilemma or not, NATO made its policy choice in July 2016 and its 
implementation has begun. The consequences of this choice are still developing 
and may yet be sent awry by President Donald Trump. Furthermore, the article 
examines whether NATO’s choice currently appears to be having the desired 
effect, as well as the shape of a prudent course for the future.
Deterrence for the Baltic States
In mid-2015, RUSI Journal published an article of make-believe future history 
which hypothesised the conduct of a fictional war between NATO and Russia in 
Estonia. An important revelation within its text was the supposition that there 
was a war-that NATO did ultimately, despite some soul-searching and ungentle 
alliance diplomacy, go to war over one of its smallest constituents. In this scenario, 
NATO forces match their Russian counterparts but do not push home a military 
victory, even one limited to Estonia, in favour of a negotiated peace in which 
Russia is not required to sacrifice much face and which gives up to Russia many of 
its other foreign policy goals. Planted by the US government, as is clear from the 
author’s initial authorship statement, the article’s purpose was to send a message 
of deterrence to Moscow by asserting that NATO and its constituents had the 
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individual and collective political will to wage a war against Russia should the 
alliance be militarily challenged1.
Yet deterrence cannot be practiced. ‘To deter’ is grammatically correct but 
strategically unsound. Deterrence is but an important side effect of one’s own 
capabilities, posture, strategy, and policy, run through the prism of the opponent’s 
perception and decision-making. “[D]eterrence is inherently unreliable…Quite 
literally, deterrence can work only if the intended deterree chooses to be deterred. 
There is no way in which such a choice, for deterrence, can be guaranteed.”2 There 
is no logical method by which deterrence may be reliably induced in general, and 
perhaps not even in specific contexts. An adversary may always decline to be 
deterred and prefer to gamble policy outcomes on the wages of battle. Yet even 
this presupposes that both sides of the would-be deterrence relationship recognise 
it as such and not as a different kind of relationship altogether. NATO cannot 
guarantee today that Russia will consider its efforts to strengthen the defences of 
the Baltic States to be a measure aimed at improving deterrence.
One of Vladimir Putin’s role models is Yuri Andropov, head of the KGB for fifteen 
years before taking over as premier of the Soviet Union in 1982. The most notable 
event of Andropov’s fifteen-month tenure in this latter office occurred in November 
1983-the Able Archer incident. An escalating sense of crisis in the Kremlin over 
previous years-fuelled by, among other external factors, US Presidential Directive 
59, which reoriented US nuclear strategy toward a countervailing concept; early 
Reaganite rhetoric; the announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative; and 
the United States’ pending deployment of intermediate ranged nuclear forces to 
Europe-climaxed during NATO’s annual Able Archer military exercises of 1983, 
nearly resulting in a potential pre-emptive Soviet nuclear strike against NATO 
targets. These US initiatives cumulatively had begun to weigh on and induce 
paranoia among the Soviet political leadership, not necessarily shared by the 
military hierarchy even one level below the Russian Chief of the General Staff, 
Nikolai Ogarkov3. “The reaction in Moscow [to recent prior events] was predictably 
 R.D. Hooker Jr.,  Operation Baltic Fortress, 2016, RUSI Journal , 3(160), 2015, pp. 26-36.
 C.S. Gray, Deterrence and the nature of strategy, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 2(11), 2000, 
p. 20.
 G.S. Barrass, The Great Cold War: A Journey Through the Hall of Mirrors, Stanford, 2009, 
pp. 300-301.
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negative, but unpredictably hysterical.”4 It was even fuelled by the Kremlin itself, 
as it sought to shift domestic attention away from the Soviet’s mistaken downing 
of the KAL 007 airliner and Reagan’s vociferous condemnation which followed5.
NATO considered the purpose of the Able Archer exercises to be the strengthening 
of deterrence, and Moscow was familiar with the exercises as they had been 
conducted annually. However, various anomalies in NATO’s procedures for Able 
Archer in 1983 set Moscow on edge, including a higher than normal level of 
alert in US bases around the Soviet Union and the inclusion of civilian policy-
makers. The unexpected presence of civilian decision-makers was particularly 
significant. Not only had they never been involved in the Able Archer exercises 
before, but due to their involvement, NATO could now escalate the exercise up 
to the simulated release of nuclear weapons rather than stopping short of civilian, 
i.e. political, decision-making levels. In the climate of paranoia that permeated 
the Kremlin, these seemed to be grave indications of NATO’s intention to launch 
a first nuclear strike.
NATO’s intended reinforcement of deterrence failed in this case because the 
Soviet leadership did not recognise in the policies and decisions the intent to 
deter, but instead saw the intention to attack. In part, this was due to linguistic 
and conceptual differences which existed in Soviet strategic thinking. “For their 
deterrence of the West, the Soviets most commonly use the word sderzhivaniye 
(restraining); for Western deterrence of them they use the word ustrasheniye, 
which comes very close to meaning ‘intimidation.’”6 The Soviet leadership did not 
view their relationship with NATO as being a basic two-way deterrent relationship. 
They believed they were deterring NATO, which in turn was trying to intimidate 
the Soviet Union. Unlike Western strategists, the Soviets did not acknowledge 
the idea of mutual deterrence. The fundamental premise which must underlie all 
thinking about deterrence is recognition that the opponent one hopes to deter 
 S.J. Cimbala,  Revisiting the Nuclear ‘War Scare’ of 1983: Lessons Retro- and Prospectively, 
Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 2(27), 2014, p. 238.
 V. Mastny,  How Able was ‘Able Archer’?Nuclear Trigger and Intelligence in Perspective, 
Journal of Cold War Studies 1(11), pp. 117-121.
 G. Jukes,  The Military Approach to Deterrence and Defense in: M. McGwire, K. Booth, 
J. McDonnell,  Soviet Naval Policy: Objectives and Constraints, New York, 1975, p. 484.
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may not believe that one is trying to deter him at all, but instead forcefully to 
intimidate or compel him7.
Returning to the present day, current Russian rhetoric conveys the same pattern 
of thought as that which reigned in 1983. Even before his third term as President, 
Putin invoked the analogy of the Second World War to justify significant military 
modernisation and reform. “We cannot afford to repeat the tragedy of 1941, 
when the lack of readiness of the state and the Army for war led to the vast loss 
of human lives.”8 Russian General Yuri Yakubov has suggested that “[i]f heavy 
U.S. military equipment, including tanks, artillery batteries and other equipment 
really does turn up in countries in eastern Europe and the Baltics, that will be 
the most aggressive step by the Pentagon and NATO since the Cold War.”9 The 
Russians have publicly stated that NATO deployments to the Baltic States would 
be regarded as aggressive actions-not as moves meant to reinforce deterrence. The 
Russians, after all, also regard the colour revolutions which occurred in Georgia, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Ukraine as American-backed coups and fear that the West is 
conspiring to bring about a coup or revolutionary violence in Russia as well10. 
In an interesting historical parallel, the Soviet Union also feared the presence of 
German troops in the Baltic States during the interwar period, and the scenario of 
a German-led Baltic regional alliance against the Soviet Union dominated Soviet 
war plans during the period11. Russian rhetoric, directed to both international 
and domestic audiences, therefore conveys an important message about their 
perceptions. Whether these messages are truthful or not is a separate question, 
but they are officially and vociferously publicised domestically and internationally. 
Russia, in its previous incarnation as the Soviet Union, has in fact previously felt 
threatened by similar configurations of power in the Baltic region.
 L. Milevski,  Deterring Able Archer: Comments Arising from Adamsky’s Lessons for 
Deterrence Theory and Practice, Journal of Strategic Studies 37(6-7), 2014, pp. 1060-1061.
 V. Putin, Being strong: National security guarantees for Russia, 29 February 2012, http://
archive.premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/18185/, [accessed: 28.10.2015].
 Quoted in: G. Baczyńska, W. Szary, Russia says will retaliate if U.S. weapons stationed on 
borders, Reuters, 15 June 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/15/us-russia-usa-
europe-idUSKBN0OV17A20150615, [accessed: 28.10.2015].
0 I. Bērziņa,  Color revolutions: Democratization, Hidden Influence, or Warfare?, Riga, 
2014, pp. 9-12.
 G. Åselius, Soviet Naval Perceptions of the Baltic Sea, 1938-41 in: M. H. Clemmesen, 
M. S. Faulkner (eds),  Northern European Overture to War, 1939-1941: From Memel to 
Barbarossa,  Leiden, 2013, p. 94.
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Rather than deterrence, Russia’s prisms for judging NATO’s decisions concerning 
the defence of the Baltic States may well be intimidation, compellence, surprise 
attack, and coup. Given such a perspective, Russia’s logical ultimate response to 
a major NATO deployment in the Baltic States is clear: pre-emption. Fortunately 
for a NATO policy emphasising deterrence, other, less radical options also exist 
for Russia to safeguard itself from another devastating war and to protect its self-
image as a great power, including continued reinforcement of Russia’s western 
military district. Yet pre-emption will remain the ultimate policy option. Actions 
by NATO’s councils and capitals, meant to deter the Russians from engaging 
in any invasive activities in the Baltic States and, by extension, from war in that 
theatre, may actually invite the Russians to do precisely those things because 
Russian perspectives diverge so fundamentally from NATO outlooks.
NATO’s chosen policy of seeking to reinforce deterrence may result in the intended 
effect, or it may result in the opposite effect. This is one horn of the dilemma which 
NATO has faced since the Russian occupation of Crimea in February/March 2014 
with regard to the defence of the Baltic States.
Baring the Baltic States
If the above analysis is apt and major deployments to the Baltic States trigger 
the war they were meant to prevent, then would it be a wiser policy option to 
leave the Baltic States bare and bereft of a present-on-their-soil collective NATO 
defence? Not necessarily. As Putin related to Charlie Rose on CBS’ 60 Minutes, 
he considered the collapse of the Soviet Union a calamity because it imposed 
international borders on the Russians. “Do you think it’s normal that 25 million 
Russian people were abroad all of a sudden? Russia was the biggest divided nation 
in the world. It’s not a problem? Well, maybe not for you. But it’s a problem for 
me”12. Problems are meant to be solved. But how might Russia solve this problem 
(for itself ) of so many Russians-and even more Russian speakers-beyond its 
borders?
 V. Putin in Charlie Rose, All Eyes on Putin, 27 September 2015, http://www.cbsnews.com/
news/vladimir-putin-russian-president-60-minutes-charlie-rose/ [accessed: 28.10.2015].
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Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has used every political instrument at its 
disposal to influence and, from its perspective, support Russians and Russian-
speakers beyond Russia’s borders. Even in the early 1990s, Russia sought, through 
the threat of armed force, to coerce the Baltic States-particularly Latvia and 
Estonia, which had and still have substantial Russophone minorities- and to 
provide the Russians living in their territories with citizenship gratis, i.e. without 
meeting the legal requirements. Russia at that point still had its old Soviet garrison 
forces in the Baltic States and threatened that it would not withdraw them-that 
is, it threatened to occupy Latvia and Estonia-unless those Baltic States bowed to 
its will. In this context, the Russian military even “openly rehearsed and discussed 
invasion scenarios for the Baltic States”, even though it was doubtful that the 
condition of the Russian army would have even permitted such an operation to 
occur13. Although neither Latvia nor Estonia succumbed to Russian coercion in 
this instance, and were supported by counter-pressure from the United States and 
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe against Russia to withdraw 
its forces from the region, Latvia was nonetheless obliged to accept thousands of 
demobilised Soviet soldiers, primarily retired officers, who had chosen to make 
Latvia their primary civilian residence before the collapse of the Soviet Union due 
to its comparatively higher standard of living.
More recently, Russia did employ force in the name of ethnic Russians, 
Russophones, or Russian citizens. In 2008, after a deliberate passportification 
campaign in which thousands of South Ossetians received Russian passports, 
Russia waged war against Georgia in the guise of humanitarian intervention. Since 
2014, it has been involved in Ukraine in the name of defence of ethnic Russians 
and Russophones.
Russia has used the media to connect Russians and Russian speakers abroad to 
Russia itself, including in the Baltic States. Russia has employed financial leverage, 
funding organisations such as the Russkiy Mir Foundation, Russian political-
cultural centres, and national Russian political parties in the Baltic States, again 
to connect Russians and Russian speakers to Russia and to turn them into Russian 
political instruments. “The political and media spheres in Latvia are closely 
 P. Ito,  Baltic Military Cooperate Projects: A Record of Success [in:] T. Lawrence, 
T. Jermalavičius (eds),  Apprenticeship, Partnership, Membership: Twenty Years of Defence 
Development in the Baltic States, Tallinn, 2013, p. 249.
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intertwined, at least in the case of Russian-language media. The aims of both the 
media and politicians have often been similar: to create a unified bloc of voters and 
consumers who are expected to act in certain ways and to take on certain values”14. 
Russia’s aim through its use of media is to exacerbate differences of perspective 
between the Balts and the Russians on emotional issues which range from shared 
Baltic-Russian history to contemporary foreign policy. Russia uses its soft power 
specifically to preserve these weaknesses and divisions in the Baltic States15. One 
Russian journalist, Pavel Baev, charitably suggests that although “Russia’s track 
record of relations with Latvia and Estonia was rather chequered…[i]t was highly 
significant that Moscow refrained from exploiting the discontent in Latvia, which 
was hit most painfully by the economic crisis”16. Yet this one instance of restraint 
is hardly comforting given Russia’s previous-as well as subsequent-attempts to 
influence events and policy-making in the Baltic States.
Russia has also sought political influence in the Baltic States through more 
direct means, including the energy sector, corruption, intelligence, and cyber 
activities. As the Baltic States are still largely reliant on the old Soviet energy 
network infrastructure, Russia has a potentially significant coercive instrument 
to use against them-and has already used it. However, it has rarely actually been 
effective in gaining Russia the political consequences which it desires17. The 
infamous cyber attacks which struck Estonia in May 2007 over the move of the 
bronze soldier statue may be the highest profile Russian attempt at coercively 
influencing a Baltic State-higher profile even than the military attempts of the 
early 1990s-but it was hardly the only case. Indeed, an almost successful case 
occurred in 2003-4 when “elements of Russia’s intelligence services and organised 
crime syndicates (interrelated factors in Russia) infiltrated the electoral campaign 
of a presidential candidate, Rolandas Paksas, and later also his staff during his 
 A. Cheskin, Russian Speakers in Post-Soviet Latvia: Discursive Identity Strategies, 
Edinburgh, 2016, p. 77.
 A. Grigas, Legacies, Coercion and Soft Power: Russian Influence in the Baltic States, 
Chatham House Briefing Paper, 2012, p. 13.
 P.K. Baev, The Russian Army as a crumbling keystone in the European security 
architecture [in:] R. N. McDermott, B. Nygren, C. Vendil Pallin (eds), The Russian Armed 
Forces in Transition: Economic, geopolitical and institutional uncertainties,  London, 2012, 
p. 103.
 K. Smith Stegen,  Deconstructing the ‘energy weapon’: Russia’s threat to Europe as case 
study, Energy Policy, 39, 2011, p. 6511.
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short presidency.” Fortunately, Lithuania’s democratic institutions prevailed and 
Paksas was impeached18.
The Baltic States cannot comfortably remain bereft of a collective defence 
because Russia has repeatedly proven itself to be willing to use any and every 
instrument of statecraft up to and including armed force in pursuit of its policy 
goals, which include the protection of Russians and Russian speakers outside 
Russia by re-incorporating them into the motherland. This emphasis on ethnicity 
and language as a basis for conquest is not new to Russian foreign policy. Russian 
cartographers during the age of the tsars, such as Pyotr Keppen (1793-1864) and 
Rodrikh Erkert (1821-1900), realised that a cartographic emphasis on language 
induced ambiguity, blurred boundaries, and justified Russian frontier expansion 
westward into east central Europe. They also contributed to this effort through 
their own cartographical work19.
Throughout the eighteenth century, the Russian Empire turned this cartographical 
ruse into imperial policy. It tried to claim Latgale, then a province of Poland but 
later Latvia’s easternmost region, based on false allegations that the population 
was in fact Belorussian, was therefore culturally Russian, and had only been 
separated from Russia by Polish conquest. This perspective was eventually 
broadened to include the generally Slavic populations of Poland, and culminated 
in the partitions of Poland which wiped it off the map of Europe by the nineteenth 
century20. In the most recent decade, Russia has, on multiple occasions, blurred 
state borders through its emphasis on ethnicity and language, and subsequently 
violated state borders using force in the name of Russians and Russian speakers 
living outside Russia-including four discrete military presences in Abkhazia, 
South Ossetia, Crimea, and the Donbas. Because Russia now has a contemporary 
record of acting in this manner, such an eventuality is a clear danger-although not 
yet necessarily a direct threat-to the Baltic States.
 J. Šleiyt�, Russia’s European Agenda and the Baltic States,  New York, 2010, p. 146.
 S. Seegel, Mapping Europe’s Borderlands: Russian Cartography in the Age of Empire, 
Chicago, 2012, pp. 118, 147.
0 A. Plakans, A Concise History of the Baltic States, Cambridge, 2011, p. 139.
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Whether or not Russia will again violate state borders through force, specifically 
with regard to the Baltic States, has become the decisive question for NATO. 
Russia’s victims in this regard, Georgia and Ukraine, aspired to membership in 
Western international institutions such as the EU and NATO, but their paths to 
the West were set awry by Russian military action. The Baltic States are different. 
Whereas Georgia and Ukraine dithered about whether to orient toward Russia 
or Europe for the better part of one or two decades, all three Baltic States pushed 
immediately, hard, and consistently for acceptance into Western political and 
security institutions, until they achieved their goals in 2004. Perhaps decisively, 
this push and eventual success occurred while Russia was relatively weak or 
otherwise constrained-first by its traumatic economic collapse in the 1990s and 
then by Putin’s attempt to forge an actual constructive relationship with George 
W. Bush and the United States in the early 2000s.
Since the accession of the Baltic States to NATO and the EU (one of the great 
nails in the coffin of good West-Russia relations), Russia has sought to limit and 
stymie Western influence in what it considers its near abroad. Displeased with 
the EU’s description of these aggregate regions as a “common neighbourhood”, 
the Kremlin sees in the EU’s naïvely un-geopolitical perspective an insidious plot 
to further the reversal of Russian fortunes since the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Having first lost its influence in the Warsaw Pact states in favour of the West, 
Russia then definitively lost the Baltic States as well. Western protestations that 
they harbour no ill will against Russia cannot be believed in Moscow because, 
regardless of Western intention, Western policies have changed the geopolitical 
landscape to Russia’s disadvantage.
The EU’s identification of not just Moldova, Belarus, and Ukraine but even the 
three south Caucasus states of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan as part of 
a common neighbourhood for both the EU and Russia could only be judged 
from Moscow as a continuation of the trend of expanding Western influence into 
regions where Russia had once reigned supreme21. Russia’s policies for limiting 
further Western influence have included aggression to pre-empt potential near 
or distant future EU and NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine. This same 
policy nearly resulted in a direct clash between Russian and NATO troops at 
 Šleiyt�, Russia’s European Agenda and the Baltic States, 53.
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Pristina airport in Kosovo in 1999. However, to date, Russia has not yet aimed 
outright to reverse Western influence once it has been established by institution, 
as in the Baltic States. Perhaps Moscow does not intend to do so, or perhaps it has 
not yet had an opportunity to do so. Yet the risk to the Baltic States may skyrocket 
if the EU and NATO begin seriously again to consider admitting Ukraine and/
or Georgia, despite recent Russian actions-aggressive wars-arguably intended to 
prevent this from happening. At such a point, Russia may feel that it has nothing 
to lose by outright military challenge to NATO, as in any case it would then be 
on the cusp of losing any hope of having a sphere of influence, losing its status 
as a great power, and being left wide open to what it considers to be insidious 
Western political influences.
Besides the two questions of ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers and of a forceful 
Russian reaction to further NATO or EU expansion, Russia has historically 
pursued a very clear policy of territorial aggrandizement in the eastern Baltic 
littoral. Historically, whenever Russia has not owned the eastern Baltic littoral, it 
has always aimed to do so and followed policies designed to bring this objective 
closer to fruition. Russian motives for repeatedly pursuing a policy which places 
it on the eastern shores of the Baltic Sea have varied over time. In early centuries, 
it sought economic benefit from dominating the region of the Baltic States. 
Russian interest in the eastern Baltic littoral has persisted since before German 
missionaries, merchants, and crusaders first appeared in 1180 and began their 
century long quest of the region, but actively grew only from the late 15th-early 
16th century reign of Ivan III of Muscovy onward. Russia has fought numerous 
wars over the centuries to bring the region under its domination. Early on, 
Russian interest was primarily about prestige and economy-the right to demand 
and collect tribute from the indigenous peoples, and later to take advantage of the 
Hanseatic trading cities which emerged on those Baltic shores.
After the First World War, the economic aspect dried up due to political factors-
primarily because the newly-established Soviet Union had no interest in trading 
with the West-but security replaced economic concerns as the prime motivator 
for conquest. The recently incorporated Baltic States were heavily militarised by 
the Soviet Union during the Cold War because they represented the Union’s only 
direct border with the Western world (save for a short border with Norway in the 
far north). With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia lost this heavily militarised 
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border as its territory shrank to that of three centuries ago. The Moscow Military 
District transformed from being “the deep rear of Russia” into Russia’s “advanced 
western defence line”22. Security is clearly a salient policy concern for Russia 
today, and its continued interest in the Baltic States runs along those lines, mixed 
with the ethnic Russian element.
Someone somewhere beyond the Kremlin surely has divined the right answer 
about Russian intentions-but the world as a whole will never know until the 
event itself comes to pass. The absence so far of a Russian move into the Baltic 
States is not evidence that it will not come eventually (this also being one of the 
fundamental difficulties of attempting to effect deterrence). After all, the day 
before Russian Special Forces moved into Crimea in February 2014, a Russian 
invasion of that peninsula had also been a non-occurrence that no one in the 
West was anticipating. Days, months, years of non-invasion inevitably precede 
the one day defined by a resort to armed force by one polity against another. 
For this reason, defence is often considered to be ‘insurance’. As noted, Russia’s 
policies toward the Baltic States since their re-attainment of independence have 
been largely unfriendly. Moreover, Russia’s policies to strengthen its armed forces 
in the region, including the February 2016 activation of the old Soviet elite 1st 
Guards Tank Army, were most often made prior, rather than in reaction to, any 
NATO policies countering Russia. The unnecessary activation of the 1st Guards 
Tank Army began in November 2014, although NATO had no stated intention of 
reinforcing the Baltic States at that point.
Moreover, if NATO does not visibly prepare for defence of the Baltic States, 
Russia may rightly or wrongly perceive this as a political message that the Baltic 
States will not be defended-that Article 5 will not be extended so far east and 
that NATO will not seriously retaliate, even if only in certain, ‘ambiguous’ 
situations. Or, as another alternative, the Kremlin may come to believe that either 
a swift overrunning or ambiguous takeover of the Baltic States may deter NATO 
from even trying, despite a pre-existing political intention to defend NATO’s 
easternmost constituents. To crack open a theatre of operations which has been 
 J. Erickson,  Russia will not be trifled with: Geopolitical facts and fantasies, Journal of 
Strategic Studies, 22(2-3), 1999, p. 243.
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locked up is a difficult task, and every potential route back into the Baltic States 
would be arduous for NATO.
This would be the case particularly if Russia adopts recent notions, continuously 
under debate, of employing nuclear weapons as an instrument of de-escalation to 
deter NATO from considering a campaign to liberate reoccupied Baltic States23. 
Russian nuclear strategic thought is anything but coherent. The debate has been 
conducted almost without regard for the actual capabilities of the Russian nuclear 
forces and whether or not those forces could implement these ideas, if they were ever 
actually officially adopted. The Russian government has yet to show any indication 
that it is prepared to adopt any concept of nuclear strategy discussed in Russian 
strategic discourse, including the most dangerous idea of nuclear de-escalation. 
Nuclear de-escalation may appear counterintuitive to Western audiences, but the 
logic is clear, although it represents a strategic gamble for Russia. In brief, the 
argument is that a Russian nuclear strike, even at battlefield level, would break 
the will of the opposing polity to continue the war. Applied to the Baltic States, 
it would suggest that once the Baltic States were overrun, Russia would launch 
a limited nuclear strike against a further NATO target to break NATO’s will 
to actually retaliate and liberate the Baltic States from Russian occupation. In 
the Baltic context, this may be an effective strategy if ever implemented, given 
how difficult it has been for the European Union just to maintain sanctions on 
Russia after its occupation of Crimea. Russian military exercises and war games 
in the recent past have sometimes culminated in simulated nuclear attacks, such 
as against Warsaw or the Copenhagen Strait, although the intelligence on these 
incidents is not always clear.
These are hypothetical futures for which there is no known evidence one way or 
the other, for or against. There is only Russian history, both distant and recent, to 
indicate Russian perspectives toward NATO, geopolitics, and the future. Yet the 
overall tenor of potential future interaction between the West and Russia seems 
unfortunately clear. There may exist no single action-or non-action-available to 
the West which is more likely to deter or prevent war than to provoke it. This is 
the second horn of the dilemma which NATO has faced since March 2014.
 J.W. Kipp,  Russia’s Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons, Military Review, 81(3) , 2001, pp. 
27-39; D. Adamsky,  If War Comes Tomorrow: Russian Thinking About “Regional Nuclear 
Deterrence”, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 27(1), 2014, pp. 163-188.
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NATO’s Choice: Working as Intended?
The West is confident in its ability to deter. Michael Howard once suggested that “we 
have become rather expert at deterrence” as a result of the Cold War experience24. 
NATO may have faced its dilemma in Baltic defence only subconsciously, unaware 
that deterrence might fail before its very inception. Nevertheless, at its summit 
in Warsaw in July 2016, NATO made a choice which favours one horn more than 
the other. Although it is not (yet, perhaps) committed to deploying significant 
heavy forces to the region, NATO has decided upon establishing a multinational 
battalion in each of the three Baltic States, as well as in Poland and has further, 
albeit temporarily, enhanced its presence in the region in response to Russia’s 
Zapad-2017 exercise. The military value of these battalions will not be high, their 
size alone precluding them from putting up a credible defence of the Baltic States 
against the armed forces of Russia’s Western Military District. Their value lies 
in their role as a multi-national tripwire for any invasion, thereby automatically 
involving a number of other NATO armed forces in the defence of the Baltic States 
from the very outset and putting NATO’s credibility as an alliance wholly on the 
line. This suggests that NATO is willing to pursue the route of deterrence and, if 
necessary, defence rather than leaving the Baltic States militarily at the mercy of 
a revisionist Russia.
Is NATO’s choice having the desired deterrent effect? One must, of course, 
acknowledge that it is impossible to know. The basic reason why NATO has 
been suffering a dilemma is also why we cannot know whether NATO’s choice is 
working: we cannot peek into Putin’s mind or that of any of his trusted advisors. 
Any public utterance or demonstration of peaceful intentions may be genuine, 
or may also be a ruse to mask hostility, and the Russian leadership certainly has 
not been trustworthy in the recent past. Nevertheless, public statements by the 
Russian leadership should be considered.
Putin has on at least two occasions since the annexation of Crimea rejected the 
notion of war with NATO. In a June 2015 interview with the Italian newspaper Il 
Corriere della Sera, he asserted “that only an insane person and only in a dream 
 M. Howard,  Lessons of the Cold War, Survival 36(4), 1994-95, p. 164.
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can imagine that Russia would suddenly attack NATO” and that such actions 
are groundless fear mongering25. More recently in an interview with Bloomberg 
Businessweek, Putin argued along similar lines. “I think all sober-minded people 
who really are involved in politics understand that the idea of a Russian threat to, 
for example, the Baltics is complete madness. Are we really about to fight NATO? 
How many people live in NATO? About 600 million, correct? There are 146 
million in Russia.” He went on to consider and disregard the possibility of nuclear 
war for the Baltic States, from Russia’s perspective as the largest nuclear power26. 
What is interesting about these interviews is that he does not single out the Baltic 
States for mention except in the wider context of war with NATO as a whole. 
One might suggest, if Putin was actually being truthful in these interviews, is 
that NATO’s choice is having the desired effect. That is, Putin considers NATO’s 
defence commitment to the Baltic States to be credible, and therefore will not 
employ military means to further Russian political goals in the three Baltic 
countries. It is often suggested that Putin understands only force and respects 
only strength. His calculations of population suggest that he may recognise that 
NATO is far stronger than Russia. Perhaps Putin simply fears the current burst 
of NATO solidarity and seeks to mollify the alliance so that it does not further 
strengthen its presence on Russia’s borders.
Other Russians do single out the Baltic States and declare that they must be the 
next target. This includes the infamous Duma member Vladimir Zhirinovsky, often 
seen as a Kremlin proxy to test public reaction to more radical policy suggestions, 
who has repeatedly hurled invective and threats at the Baltic States ever since 
they regained independence. Given Zhirinovsky’s potential ties with the Kremlin, 
Putin’s comments may be pure misdirection. Why highlight and unnecessarily 
foreworn a potential target of one’s intentions? His statements may mollify those 
in NATO who are already predisposed toward forgiving and forgetting Russian 
aggression in Ukraine and who may not be wholly willing to expend the resources 
 L. Fontana,  Vladimir Putin, interview to the Italian newspaper «Il Corriere della 
Sera»”, Il Corriere Della Sera, 7 June 2015, http://www.corriere.it/english/15_giugno_07/
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to contribute to even a token allied force in the Baltic States. Putin may be telling 
the truth, or he may be trying to lull NATO into a sense of complacency about 
Baltic defence. Perhaps NATO’s response to Russian actions since February 2014 
has been beyond Putin’s expectations, and he feels that he must split NATO’s 
members up as much as possible before his next act of aggression, through 
incessant disinformation, the financial sponsorship of pro-Kremlin parties 
throughout Europe, and so on. Russia has also been consistently expanding its 
armed presence near the Baltic States since 2014, through the activation of the 1st 
Guards Tank Army as well as the reformation of two divisions.
Finally, President Trump may be a wildcard in the issue, as he alternately berates 
NATO and especially its European constituents, and then sends officials to 
reaffirm the credibility of Article 5. Furthermore, he personally appears to desire 
a close and warm relationship with Russia, but is blocked in this endeavour by 
the US Congress. Thus, it is unclear how much influence, for good or ill, Trump 
may have on NATO’s past decisions or Russia’s perceptions going into the future. 
However much high level policy appears to sway unsteadily in Trump’s hands, 
implementation of NATO’s collective decision from the Warsaw Summit in July 
2016 has hardly been altered at all on the ground.
Ultimately, it is impossible to know whether or not Russia has truly been deterred 
by NATO defence policy regarding the Baltic States. Uncertainty reigns concerning 
both Russian intentions and the future. In this context of uncertainty, the political, 
strategic, and even moral imperative is to follow prudent policies. NATO, as the 
main guardian of the current status quo which so favours the West, is a status 
quo alliance. It is a defensive alliance. The consequences for which NATO policies 
should aspire in the name of prudence are those which protect the status quo 
through deterrence, if possible, and defence, if necessary. As Bernard Brodie 
argued during the Cold War about waging nuclear war, “[s]o long as there is a finite 
chance of war, we have to be interested in outcomes; and although practically all 
outcomes would be bad, some would be much worse than others”27.
It is in NATO’s interest to avoid a defensive war in Europe without sacrificing 
anything if at all possible, through achieving effective deterrence. Failing that, it is 
 B. Brodie,  The Anatomy of Deterrence, World Politics 11(2), 1959, p. 178.
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in NATO’s interest to fight and defend the Baltic States. Many have speculated on 
the consequences to NATO and the EU of failing to protect the Baltic States from 
potential Russian aggression. The gravest consequence would be the loss of trust 
and solidarity among alliance and/or union members, which may potentially lead 
to the break-up of either or both organisations. It is prudent to attempt to create 
a deterrent relationship with Russia, it would be prudent to fight to defend the 
Baltic States, so that the current form and integrity of the Western world may be 
preserved. Even if many consider it unthinkable, NATO should be prepared for 
adverse outcomes to its current policies. It should be prepared actually to wage 
war if necessary. NATO has made its choice in the defence policy dilemma which 
it confronted in the name of Baltic defence. It remains to be seen how the beast 
behind the horns of the dilemma will react in the long-term.
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